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 Emerging constitutionalism and its inherent concept of “higher law” brought 
about a fundamental change of the institutional setting of many states in 19th and 
20th century. It has significantly increased powers of the judicial branch and in-
troduced a new concept of the separation of powers doctrine. Courts, formerly 
subservient to legislature, have commenced to exert new powers of judicial re-
view imposing new checks on the legislative and the executive branch. 
 The ratified international treaties make part of the Croatian legal order that 
national courts are bound to enforce, and the European Convention is granted 
constitutional protection before the Constitutional Court. This Court, having pow-
ers to strike down unconstitutional legislation has a chance, at least in theory, to 
impose significant checks on the legislative and executive branch. Moreover, the 
Constitutional court has clarified that ordinary courts have to treat the Convention 
as entrenched, “higher law” in a manner similar to the one accorded to constitu-
tional provisions; in other words, the Convention is directly applicable in the 
Croatian legal order and enjoys a quasi-constitutional rank. 
 
 Introduction 
 Emerging constitutionalism and its inherent concept of “higher law” brought about a 
fundamental change of the institutional setting of many states in 19th and 20th century. 
It has significantly increased powers of the judicial branch and introduced a new con-
cept of the separation of powers doctrine. Courts, formerly subservient to legislature, 
have commenced to exert new powers of judicial review imposing new checks on the 
legislative and the executive branch. This process of increasing the role of the judiciary 
was formally initiated in the United States, in the landmark Marbury v. Madison case 
which affirmed the right of the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. In 
 
* Paper presented at International Conference “The Contribution of Constitutional Arrangements to the 
Stability of South Eastern Europe”, (Brdo, Slovenia, 29-30 November 1999) 
 
Rodin, S., Application of the European..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXVI, (1999), No. 5, pp. 93—108 94 
                                                                                                                                              
Europe, one of the most remarkable developments occurred in post WWII Germany 
where an efficient judicial mechanism for the protection of constitutional rights was set 
in place (Verfassungsbeschwerde) in order to remedy the Weimar situation where rights 
were guaranteed by the Constitution but were not granted judicial protection. The early 
concepts of constitutional review, except maybe in the United States under the suprem-
acy clause of Art. VI(2), referred only to a higher legal status of national constitutions. 
However, this has been extended to certain categories of international treaties in the pe-
riod following WWII. In such developments, some international treaties were framed in 
a way which enabled their self-executing status, and many national constitutions pro-
vided for their direct applicability in their national legal order. This has brought about a 
new quality of international law and granted international treaties an entrenched status 
similar to the status of national constitutional law. At the same time, in legal systems 
featuring constitutional review, like in Germany, Slovenia or Croatia, this development 
has vested respective constitutional courts with new powers capable of imposing sig-
nificant checks on national legislative and executive authorities.1 
 In this paper I shall first discuss the legal status of international treaties in the Croa-
tian national legal order with a specific reference to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention),2 
as the emerging higher law in the Croatian legal order, and then, in my final remarks, 
discuss the role of the Constitutional Court in enforcing fundamental rights and in safe-
guarding the Constitutional checks and balances. 
 
 The status of international law and the Convention in the national le-
gal order 
I. 
 The problem how to define the position of international law in an internal legal or-
der can be approached either from the viewpoint of the international or the national law. 
However, Croatian scholars have mainly concentrated on the international legal aspects 
of this issue. It is witnessed by a number of scholars who have analyzed the problem 
from the international legal angle, namely V. Ibler,3 V. Đ. Degan,4 B. Vukas,5 and more 
recently V. Crnić-Grotić.6 Unlike these authors I would like to discuss constitutional le-
 
1 This remark also refers to ordinary courts. 
2 European Treaty Series No. 5, with amendments (ETS Nos. 45, 55 and 118). 
3 V. Ibler, Odnos međunarodnog i unutrašnjeg prava, Naša zakonitost, Vol. 11 No. 11-12 (1957) pp. 425-
431. 
4 V. Đ. Degan, Odnos međunarodnog i unutrašnjeg prava, Naša Zakonitost, Vol. 19. No. 4 (1965) pp. 
306-316. 
5 B. Vukas, Odnos unutrašnjeg pravnog poretka prema pravilima međunarodnog prava po Ustavu SFR 
Jugoslavije od godine 1974., Zbornik PFZ Vol. 24, No. 2-3 (1974), pp. 241-253. 
6 Vesna Crnić-Grotić, Pravni položaj međunarodnih ugovora u Republici Hrvatskoj, Vladavina prava, 
Vol. 1, No. 1(1997) pp. 17-39. 
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gal aspects of the position of international treaties in the Croatian legal order, particu-
larly the legal status of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. It is not intention of this paper to discuss theoretical differ-
ences between legal monism and legal dualism.7 Moreover, any prior judgement about 
the dominant approach seems to be inappropriate. Namely, as witnessed by State prac-
tice, neither the monist nor the dualist approach can be applied consequently in respect 
of all sources of international law. 
 The relationship between the national and the international law in Croatia is partly 
regulated by the Constitution of 1990, as amended on January 27th 1998,8 and partly by 
the Law on Ratification and Implementation of International Treaties.9 However, both 
sources regulate only the legal status of international treaties and say nothing about 
other sources of international law. According to the original concept of the Draft Con-
stitution, the intention of the founding fathers was to introduce a monist understanding 
of the relationship between the international and the national law.10 The monist concept 
was finally introduced into the constitutional text where, pursuant to article 134, the 
ratified international treaties make part of internal legal order of the Republic and have 
legal force higher than ordinary laws.  
 The status of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in the Republic of Croatia is, formally speaking, equivalent to 
the status of other international treaties. However, due to its specific subject matter, leg-
islative regulation and practice of the Constitutional Court, one could speak about its 





7 According to the monistic approach, internal law and international law make an integral system of legal 
rules binding both the States and the individuals. Ideally, this would mean that, in theory, all applicable rules 
of international law, customary and contractual, make part of a single legal order, and have to be applied di-
rectly.  Under the so-called dualistic approach, international law and national law make two distinct and inde-
pendent legal systems. Their norms regulate the relations among different subjects, and their rules originate 
from different sources. Having this in mind, the dualistic approach says that international law and national law 
can never be in conflict. If a rule of internal law of certain State is contrary to international law, this, by itself 
does not amount to its invalidity. However, the application of regulations contrary to international law 
amounts to a breach of an international obligation of a State and leads to its international legal responsibility. 
In order to be applied in the national legal order, a rule of international law has to be imported to a national le-
gal system. Once imported, it loses its international legal character and has to be applied as any other rule of 
national law. See e.g. Daniel P. O'Connell, The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 
48 Geo. L. J. (1960) 431 et seq. 
8 Narodne novine (Official Journal) No. 8/1998 (consolidated text). 
9 Narodne novine No. 28/1996. 
10 Vjesnik, Nov. 27th 1990, p. 6. However, Vukas holds that the Constitution mainly follows the dualist 
position. Compare: Juraj Andrassy et al. Međunarodno pravo, 1. dio, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1995 at p. 6. 
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II. 
 In order to determine the legal status and the conditions of the application of the 
Convention in the Republic of Croatia one has to make certain initial distinctions: 
a. distinction between the European Human Rights Convention as an international 
treaty from its legal rules; 
b. distinction between the legal status and the conditions for the application of the 
Convention in the Republic of Croatia before, from its legal status and the condi-
tions for the application after the Convention has become part of the Croatian inter-
nal legal order pursuant to Article 134 of the Constitution; 
c. distinction between the substantive rules of the Convention specifying guarantees of 
fundamental rights from other provisions of the Convention; 
d. distinction between the self-executing legal rules of the Convention from the non-
self executing ones. 
 (ad a.) Being an international treaty, the legal status of the European Convention in 
the Croatian national legal order is regulated pursuant to Article 134 of the Constitu-
tion,11 pursuant to Law on the Ratification and Implementation of International Trea-
ties,12 and pursuant to Article 5 of the Judiciary Act.13 Since an international treaty can 
become part of the Croatian legal order only pursuant to Article 134 of the Constitution, 
the application of Article 5 of the Law on Courts is possible subject to the fulfillment of 
Constitutional requirements. Certainly, those international treaties that are not ratified in 
accordance with the Constitution cannot be applied in Croatia as international treaties. 
However, this does not mean that the legal rules of international treaties, i.e. their sub-
stance, cannot be applied on the basis of some other legal rule of national law. In Croa-
tia, this is possible in at least two ways: a legal rule of the national law can incorporate 
one or more legal rules of an international treaty or; a legal rule of the national law may 
invoke one or more rules of an international treaty and provide for its application in 
Croatia. Either situation does not amount to the application of an international treaty but 
to the application of the national law, the substance of which is identical to the sub-
stance of respective legal rules of an international treaty. 
 (ad b.) The Republic of Croatia signed the European Convention on November 6th 
1996, and ratified it on October 17th 1997. The instruments of ratification were depos-
ited on November 5th 1997 and the Convention was published in the Narodne novine 
(Official Gazette) No. 18/1997 – Supplement International Treaties. In this way the 
Convention became part of the Croatian internal legal order with legal force superior to 
ordinary laws. 
 
11 Article 134 of the Constitution reads as follows: International treaties, concluded and ratified in accor-
dance with the Constitution, and published, which are in force, make part of the internal legal order of the Re-
public of Croatia and have legal force superior to laws. Their provisions can be amended or repealed, only un-
der the conditions, and in the way specified therein, or subject to general rules of international law. 
12 Zakon o sklapanju i izvršavanju međunarodnih ugovora, Narodne novine No. 28/1996. 
13 Zakon o sudovima, Narodne novine No. 3/1994. 
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 However, even before this date the Convention was explicitly invoked by the Con-
stitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and Freedoms and Rights of Ethnic and 
National Communities or Minorities (hereinafter: the Constitutional Law).14 
 (ad c.) Not every provision of the Convention contains substantive guarantees of 
fundamental rights. These guarantees are located mainly in Part 1 of the Convention, 
i.e. in Articles 2 to 18 and the provisions of a number of Protocols (e.g. in the provi-
sions of Protocol One and Protocol Four). On the other hand, Parts II, III, IV and V of 
the Convention do not contain any substantive guarantees but define the bodies estab-
lished by the Convention and set forth the conditions for its application. 
 (ad d.) The legal rules of the Convention, whether containing substantive guarantees 
of fundamental rights or not, are capable of being directly applicable (self-executing) in 
national legal systems. This depends on two factors: on the technical characteristics of 
the respective legal rule,15 and on the terms of the national legal system in which the 
rule is to be applied. The Croatian legal system does not make any obstacles for a direct 
application of the legal rules of international treaties in its national legal order. Directly 
applicable legal rules have to be applied by all state authorities, including courts and 
public administration. The legal rules of applicable international treaties make part of 
the Croatian national legal order and are directly applicable pursuant to Article 134 of 
the Constitution and Article 5, sections 2 and 3 of the Judiciary Act. However, in prac-
tice, the direct application of treaties is not a practice of Croatian ordinary courts. 
 After having presented these four distinctions I shall try to answer several important 
questions.  
i. What is the relationship between the substantive guarantees of fundamental rights 
specified by the Convention and the substantive guarantees of fundamental rights 
specified by the Croatian Constitution?  
ii. What was the legal status of the Convention and of the legal rules of the Convention 
prior to the ratification, and what is the said legal status today, after the Convention 
has been ratified?  
iii. To what extent, if any, are the Convention, its legal rules and decisions of the Euro-
pean Commission and of the European Court of Human Rights legally binding for 
Croatian authorities?  
iv. Can the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention be protected in the Con-
stitutional Complaint procedure before the Croatian Constitutional Court?  
 
14 Ustavni zakon o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina 
u Republici Hrvatskoj (consolidated text) Narodne novine No. 34/1992. 
15 For requirements for direct applicability in the United States see Foster and Elam v. Neilson,  27 U.S. 
(2 Pet.) 253 The European Court in Luxembourg in the course of its lengthy practice, elaborated the condi-
tions for a direct applicability of the legal rules of European Law in member states. See e.g. cases 26/62 Van 
Gend en Loos v. Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, i 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. 
[1964] ECR 585. Under these cases, a legal rule can be directly applicable provided it is clear and uncondi-
tional, and not dependent upon a positive legislative measure enacted under national law. 
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v. Can the Convention serve as a criterion for judicial review of laws and other regula-
tions, and who may have jurisdiction in such cases?  
 
 i. Substantive guarantees of fundamental rights under the Convention and under the 
Croatian Constitution 
 As it is generally acknowledged, Member States of the Council of Europe signato-
ries to the European Convention can provide for the protection of fundamental rights 
guaranteed therein in more than one way.16 Certainly, a combination of different meth-
ods is also possible. As far as ensuring the application in the Republic of Croatia is con-
cerned, it has to be said that the Croatian Constitution guarantees fundamental rights 
and freedoms quite generously. Therefore one should not be surprised by the frequent 
assertions that the substantive guarantees of the Convention coincide with the substan-
tive guarantees of the Croatian Constitution. In addition to the Constitution, another le-
gal source of fundamental rights in Croatia is the Constitutional Act on Human Rights. 
However, Croatian legal scholars are not unanimous as to whether the Constitutional 
Act stands for a mere declaration of rights and freedoms that are otherwise guaranteed 
by the Constitution, or whether it introduces some additional guarantees. Namely, Arti-
cle 2 of the Constitutional Act enumerates particular rights but at the same time invokes 
relevant provisions of the Croatian Constitution. This interesting method led some ana-
lysts to assert that Article 2 amounts to a restatement of pre-existing constitutional 
rights. According to their view, the Constitutional Act did not create or introduce any 
fundamental right in addition to those guaranteed by the Constitution. Having assumed 
that the Croatian Constitution is in compliance with the Convention, this interpretation 
implies that it was the Constitution and not the Constitutional Act that incorporated 
substantive guarantees of the Convention. Accordingly, the formal Constitution pro-
vides for the same guarantees as the Convention and should be considered the sole legal 
source of fundamental rights. 
 Another possible interpretation of Article 2, point (lj.) of the Constitutional Act, 
concerns the straightforward and quite explicit wording invoking the rights guaranteed 
by the international instruments mentioned in Article 1 of the Constitutional Act, in-
cluding the European Convention. Also, when interpreting Articles 1 and 2 of the Con-
stitutional Act one should bear in mind that at the time of its enactment Croatia was not 
a member of the Council of Europe and was not eligible to become a party to the Euro-
pean Convention. The specific invocation of the European convention in Article 1 of 
the Constitutional Act was most likely meant to enable the legal protection of the fun-
damental rights guaranteed by the European Convention in the period before the Con-
vention became part of the Croatian legal order. In this way the Constitutional Act 
made possible the indirect application of the legal rules of the Convention pursuant to 
its Article 1 and Article 2 (lj.). The logical consequence was that the legal rules of the 
 
16 See e.g.  Fawcet, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, Clarendon Press, Ox-
ford, 1987., at p. 4; see also S. Rodin, Europska integracija i Ustavno pravo, IMO, Zagreb 1997, at p. 221 et. 
seq. 
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Convention were granted legal force equivalent to the Constitutional Act, i.e. legal 
force superior to ordinary laws.  
 If one accepts the interpretation according to which a list of freedoms and rights 
guaranteed by Article 2 (lj.) of the Constitutional Act is non-exhaustive, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that the Constitutional Act invoked the Convention in pursuance of 
legislature's intention to give the rights under the Convention national legal protection 
even before the ratification. This would arguably serve as the legal basis for the applica-
tion of substantive rules of the Convention prior to the ratification. In other words, such 
legal rules would be incorporated by the Constitutional Act, and applied indirectly. Ac-
cordingly, they would follow the legal force of the Constitutional Act. 
 However, according to the interpretation under which the Constitutional Act is a 
mere declaratory of the rights already specified by the Constitution, i.e. that Article 2 of 
the Constitutional Act only reiterates Constitutional guarantees, it should be concluded 
that the Legislature, at the time of the enactment of the Constitutional Act considered 
the Croatian legal system to be in compliance with the Convention or, in other words, 
that all fundamental rights and freedoms under the Convention were, from the very be-
ginning, specified in the Constitution, i.e. incorporated by the Constitution itself, and 
not by the Constitutional Act.  
 In fact, both arguments seem to be wrong and ill-founded. Whether one thinks that 
the guarantees of fundamental rights originate from the Constitution, or from the Con-
stitutional act, it necessarily assumes the position known from e.g. German legal history 
which has now become obsolete, that it is the State and the positive law that are the 
source of fundamental rights. Such a position was represented by Georg Jellinek and his 
“Statustheorie” according to which citizens exercise their rights through four civic posi-
tions, which all depend on their prior recognition by the State.17 It entirely disregards 
the Lockean tradition and heritage of post WWII constitutionalism according to which 
fundamental rights and liberties antecede positive law, and according to which the le-
gitimacy of government depends on whether it recognizes the pre-existing fundamental 
rights or not. After all, the wording of the Croatian Constitution explicitly supports this 
position by saying, in article 14, that all men and citizens have fundamental rights. The 
constitutional text is therefore declaratory thereof. In this respect, the debate about the 
positive source of fundamental rights seems to be futile. Whether they are declared by 
the Constitution, by the Constitutional Act or by international law, the Constitutional 
Court is bound to give them legal protection.  
 Having general characteristics of the Convention in mind, especially the fact that it 
is a living instrument subject to an interpretation by the European Court (and formerly 
the European Commission) of human rights, as well as the experience of some other 
parties to the Convention, it cannot be ruled out that the guarantees under the Conven-
tion are broader than the constitutional guarantees. In this context, German practice is 
particularly interesting. Namely, the Federal Constitutional Court – the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht – has a standing practice of interpreting constitutional norms in the light of 
 
17 Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 
Tübingen 1919., pp. 86, 7; Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd ed. 1914) p. 418. 
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the Convention, and considers that the guarantees of human rights under the Conven-
tion are a constituent part of German substantive law. So has the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht in Pakelli18 case held that a violation of a right under the Convention amounts to 
a violation of Article 2 I of the Basic Law guaranteeing the right to a free development 
of personality.19 
 
 ii. Differential legal status of the Convention and of its legal rules in case law of the 
Constitutional Court  
 The problem of the legal status of the Convention and of its legal rules arose, at least 
partially, from the imprecise wording of Article 134 of the Constitution. The fact that 
certain legal rules of the Convention were applied even prior to the implementation of 
the procedure envisaged by article 134 of the Constitution does not help to clarify the 
situation. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the legal status of the Convention and 
of its legal rules in the period prior to the ratification from its legal status following the 
ratification. Some light on this issue has been shed by the Constitutional Court. 
 Back in 1993, the Constitutional Court held that by an explicit reference to the Con-
vention in Article 1 of the Constitutional Act, the Convention was “incorporated in the 
Croatian legislation” by which it became part of the internal legal order of the Republic 
with legal force superior to ordinary laws. Having said this, the Constitutional Court in-
dicated that the legal rules of the Convention can be applied in Croatia not only under 
Article 134 of the Constitution, but under the Constitutional Act itself. It is sufficiently 
clear that prior to the implementation of the procedure under Article 134 of the Consti-
tution there was no legal basis for the application of the Convention as a Treaty to 
which Croatia is a party. Obviously, re-writing the Constitution in this way, which 
would allow for a direct applicability of international treaties regardless of the explicit 
Constitutional procedure was not what the Constitution intended to imply. Following 
severe criticism from legal and political circles the Constitutional Court corrected its 
position on February 2nd 1995 deciding on the constitutionality of the Statute of Istrian 
County. On this occasion the Court explicitly said that only the ratified and published 
international treaties can have legal effect in the national legal order.20 According to its 
opinion, compliance with the principles proclaimed by international treaties does not 
amount to their ratification. In fact, the Constitutional Court resorted to an interpretation 
of Croatian law in accordance with the Convention (in German law this method of in-
terpretation is known as Völkerrechtfreundliche Auslegung).  
 However, regardless of the legal basis for the application of the legal rules of the 
European Convention in the Croatian legal order, the Constitutional Court deems that 
fundamental freedoms and rights specified therein deserve constitutional legal protec-
 
18 BVerfG (Vorprüfungsausschuß), decision of October 11th  1985, 2 BvR 336/85; see also EuGRZ 1985 
at p. 654, NJW 1986, at p. 1485. 
19 On the right to free development of personality in German constitutional law see: Siniša Rodin, Pravo 
na slobodno razvijanje osobnosti u njemačkom ustavnom pravu, Zbornik PFZ, 1/2 (1997) pp. 127-157. 
20 Decision No. U-II-433/1994 of February 2nd 1995, Narodne novine 9/1995. 
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tion. The Court expressed this position in two instances, one preceding and another fol-
lowing the above mentioned Decision of February 2nd 1995. In both cases the Court in-
terpreted the Constitutional Act and, using the same wording, clarified certain aspects 
of the application of the Convention. According to the Decision of the Constitutional 
court of November 14th 1994,21 instituting the procedure for a constitutional review of 
Article 94 of the Tenancy Act22 and to the Decision of February 20th 199523 instituting 
the proceedings for a constitutional review of article 70 of the same Act, the Court held 
that Article 2, point (lj.) of the Constitutional Act extended the list of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights in order to include all the rights envisaged by international legal in-
struments, and especially by the General Declaration of Human Rights of December 
10th 1948, by the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, the International Pact 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and by the European Convention on the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.24 
 In any case, making the distinction between the European Convention as an interna-
tional treaty and the legal rules of the convention, i.e. from its substantive guarantees, 
seems to be productive in explaining how the Croatian Constitutional Court gave effect 
to certain provisions of the Convention, even before it became part of the Croatian legal 
order. It is the substantive rights of the Convention that are “…granted protection under 
the Constitution…”25 In other words, the Constitutional Court elevated these substan-
tive guarantees to the rank of higher law which is granted protection before the Consti-
tutional Court. 
 After having been duly ratified and published, the Convention assumed its Constitu-
tional status pursuant to Article 134 of the Constitution. This was reflected in the early 
decisions of the Constitutional Court which have developed into its standing position up 
to this day. In its decision of March 11th 1998, the Constitutional Court had an oppor-
tunity to refer to the Convention as to the Croatian national law for the first time.26 By 
saying this, the Court not only affirmed the status of the Convention in the Croatian na-
tional legal order, but paved the way for a possible abstract constitutional review of the 
Croatian legislation regarding the Convention. This possibility is, however, not self-
evident. Under Article 125 of the Constitution, the Court has the power to review legis-
lation as to its compatibility with the Constitution. The review of its compatibility with 
international treaties is not explicitly mentioned. Another interesting fact is that, unlike 
e.g. in Germany, where ratified international treaties assume the legal status of imple-
 
21 Decision No. U-I-892/1994. 
22 Zakon o stambenim odnosima. 
23 Decision No. U-I-130/1995 
24 Decision U-I-892/1994. of November 14th 1994, Narodne novine No. 83/1994; Decision U-I-130/1995 
of February 20th  1995, Narodne novine No. 12/1995 at pp. 368, 369 
25 Decision No. U-I-892/1994. of November 14th 1994, Narodne novine No. 83/1994; Decision No. U-I-
130/1995 of February 20th 1995, Narodne novine No.  12/1995 at p. 368, 369. 
26 Decisions No. U-I-920/95 and U-I-950/96 of March 11th 1998. Narodne novine, 41/98 of March 24th  
1998. 
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menting legislation (act of ratification), in Croatia under Article 134 of the Constitution, 
all international treaties have a higher legal rank than ordinary laws.27 The question to 
be asked is whether its legal force supercedes the so-called “organic laws” which can be 
adopted by qualified majority. The entrenched legal status of the Convention bears well 
known legal consequences. It is indisputable that its application has primacy in respect 
of all laws, and all prior organic laws (lex superior derogat legi inferiori; lex posterior 
derogat legi priori). However, the Constitution is silent on the issue whether the Con-
vention has primacy in respect of later organic laws. This problem has not gone unno-
ticed in comparative constitutional law. Spain, for example, by its 1978 Constitution 
accorded constitutional legal force to international human rights treaties and introduced 
an obligation to interpret national law in accordance with the ratified treaties in the 
field.28 
 However, despite the imprecise constitutional wording, it has to be taken that the 
Convention has primacy in respect of all laws, including organic laws, even if enacted 
following its ratification. This conclusion follows from three different arguments. The 
first argument tells us that all laws have to be interpreted in accordance with the Con-
vention. Such practice is well known in England29 and Germany.30 Namely, it should be 
assumed that the legislator does not intend to make laws contrary to the Convention in 
the absence of clear and unambiguous wording. All institutions applying the Conven-
tion, primarily courts, should have this in mind.31 
 
27 This is a serious deviation from Kelsen's normativist concept according to which legal force of legal 
acts originates from the methods of its enactment. The more stringent majority - the higher legal force. The 
Convention was ratified by simple majority, and has assumed higher legal force than laws. 
28 A. P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, Oceana 
Publications, Inc, Dobbs Ferry, New York; see also Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human 
Rights Treaties, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. (1997) 211, 217. 
29 As it was put by Lord Diplock in Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd.  [1983] 2 AC 751, “…it is a 
principle of construction of the United Kingdom statutes, now too well established to call for citation of au-
thority, that the words of a statute passed after the Treaty has been signed and dealing with the subject matter 
of the international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of 
bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out the obligation, and not to be inconsistent with it.” See also 
Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998. 
30 BverfGE 74, 358 (370), “When interpreting the Basic Law, the substance and the status of the devel-
opment of the European Human Rights Convention have to be taken into consideration, to the extent that it 
does not lead to a limitation or reduction of the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution, which is excluded by the Convention itself (Article 60 of the Convention). In the same decision 
the Federal Constitutional Court said that all subsequent laws have to be interpreted in light of the European 
Convention (Völkerrechtfreundliche Auslegung); See also: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Das Bundesverfassungs-
gericht und die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler, Bd. II, Walter de 
Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1987. 
31 This principle of construction was known in the United States as of 1804: “…an Act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains”, Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) 
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 Second, even if some organic law is contrary to the Convention, one could advocate 
an opinion that the Convention represents lex specialis, which would ensure its priority 
in application. 
 The third argument is of a somewhat more complicated nature and is based on the 
distinction of the Convention as an international treaty, and of the substantive rules of 
the Convention. Namely, Article 134 of the Croatian Constitution specifies that the in-
ternational treaties being part of the Croatian legal order can be amended or abrogated 
“…only under the conditions and in the manner specified therein, or in accordance with 
general rules of international law.” This by itself means that the Convention may not be 
abrogated by any legal rule of the Croatian national law, not even an organic law. 
Should ever such a law, enacted after the Convention, become part of the Croatian legal 
order, unequivocally attempting to abrogate Croatian international obligations under the 
Convention, it would bear two sets of consequences. On the one hand, such an act 
would not have any effect in respect to Croatia's international obligations, nor could it 
abrogate substantive guarantees which are, as we have seen earlier, granted constitu-
tional protection, but could prevent direct application of the Convention in the national 
legal order. On the other hand, such an act would amount to a violation of international 
law and international legal responsibility of Croatia, and to a violation of the Croatian 
Constitution. Namely, the Constitutional Court held in its landmark decision of July 
15th 1998 that a violation of an international treaty amounts to a violation of the Consti-
tution.32 This decision has created at least two important procedural effects: (a.) in case 
of doubt that a law which has to be applied in a case before an ordinary court is incom-
patible with an international treaty, ordinary courts are now under obligation to ask the 
Supreme Court to institute proceedings before the Constitutional Court in order to es-
tablish whether the contested law is compatible with the Constitution and the Conven-
tion or not, and (b.) if a regulation which has to be applied is contrary to an interna-
tional treaty, an ordinary court is obliged to disapply such regulation and apply the in-
ternational treaty. 
 
 iii. The binding force of the Convention 
 As to the binding force of the Convention, it is binding for all state authorities – leg-
islative, executive and judicial. This follows directly from Article 134 of the Constitu-
tion. This binding force, certainly, extends to case law of the European Commission and 
the European Court of Human Rights, what follows from article 53 of the Convention 
which is part of the Croatian national legal order. In other words, this binding force 
originates not only from the international, but from the Croatian constitutional law as 
well. This is all too important considering the self-executing nature of the Convention. 
Namely, Croatian courts have an express mandate to apply international treaties under 
the Constitution and under Article 5 of the Judiciary Act.  
 
32 See: Siniša Rodin, Nesuglasnost zakona s međunarodnim ugovorom jest povreda ustava, (Incompatibil-
ity of a Law with International Treaties Amounts to a Violation of the Constitution), 48 Zbornik PFZ (1998) 4, 
pp. 491-493. 
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 A separate issue concerns possible general effects of the Court’s decisions. Despite 
the fact that its decisions have effect primarily inter partes, certain general effects, i.e. 
effects erga omnes cannot be excluded. The Vasilescu case provides a good example 
and its effects reach far beyond the actual parties in the dispute.33 The concept of de 
facto confiscation and its consequences regarding the violations of the First protocol 
probably produce general vertical effects in all State parties to the Convention, includ-
ing Croatia.  
 
 iv. Applicability of the Convention in the Constitutional Complaint procedure 
 Having in mind the constitutional status of the rules of the Convention in the Croa-
tian legal order, it follows that (unlike in Germany, where Verfassungbeschwerde for 
the protection of rights under the Convention is inadmissible due to its legal rank which 
follows legal force of ratifying legislation),34 the constitutional complaint should be 
admissible for their protection. Namely, under the Constitutional Act on Human Rights, 
Croatia undertakes to respect and protect fundamental rights “in accordance with” the 
European Convention. This wording primarily denotes substantial guarantees, but does 
not exclude procedural ones. Namely, the obligation of all courts, ordinary and the 
Constitutional court under Article 13 of the Convention to render “an effective legal 
remedy”, includes admissibility of constitutional complaint, which has been confirmed 
by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the landmark decision of the Constitutional 
Court that the rights under the Convention are granted constitutional protection has to 
be understood in both substantive and procedural sense. Moreover, a high degree of 
overlapping of substantive guarantees under the Convention with those under the Con-
stitution has been affirmed by the Constitutional Court in the above mentioned decision 
of July 15th 1998, following which every violation of the Convention should be taken 
as a breach of the Constitution itself. 
 As to the problem of the exhaustion of legal remedies, similarly to the situation in 
Germany,35 for purposes of the Convention it shall be exhausted (a.) upon the delivery 
of a decision of the Constitutional Court on the merits denying the contested right, and 
(b.) upon a dismissal of a constitutional complaint as inadmissible. Certainly, the stand-
ing practice of the European Court according to which Article 26 of the Convention has 
 
33 Case Vasilescu v. Romania (53/1997/837/1043), judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 
May 22nd 1998 
34 However, Article 93. 4.a. of the Grundgesetz provides for the protection of constitutional rights pursu-
ant to the constitutional complaint procedure. 
35 As to the procedure, for purpose of an individual petition, national legal remedies shall be exhausted 
upon a decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and in case of its lack of jurisdiction, some other federal 
court. In this respect, the practice of the Bundesverfasungsgericht departs from case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The European Court takes an application for the protection before the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht as a requirement for filing an individual petition. See. e.g.  Jacques Robert, Constitutional and 
International Protection of Human Rights: Competing or Complementary Systems? 15 Hum. Rts. L. J. 1-2 
(1994) 1 at p. 19. See also Paul Kirchof, Verfassungsrechtlicher Schutz und internationaler Schutz der Men-
schenrechte: Konkurrenz oder Ergänzung?, EuGRZ 1994, pp. 16, 35. 
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to be applied in a flexible way and without formalism, according to the circumstances 
of each individual case, should be taken into account.36 
 
 v. Abstract Constitutional Review 
 A separate issue involves the problem whether the Convention can serve as a crite-
rion and standard for constitutional review of laws and other regulations, and who, if 
anybody, has jurisdiction to decide on the compatibility of laws and other regulations 
with the Convention? 
 Under the Croatian model of constitutional review, such control can be abstract, ac-
cessory and concrete, respectively. An abstract constitutional review is performed by 
the Constitutional Court under articles 34 and 36 of the Constitutional Act on the Con-
stitutional Court,37 either upon an initiative by an authorised institution or an individual, 
or upon its own initiative. Accessory control of the constitutionality of the regulations 
(other than laws) is performed by ordinary courts under the exception of illegality pro-
cedure set forth in Article 24 (3) of the Judiciary Act38 and Article 35 of the Constitu-
tional Act on the Constitutional Court. A concrete review of the constitutionality is per-
formed by the Constitutional Court upon a motion of the Supreme Court (Article 34(1) 
of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court and Article 24 (1) and (2) of the 
Judiciary Act). 
 The compatibility of governmental regulations (in the wording of the Constitutional 
Act: “other regulations”) with the Constitution and with laws can be reviewed by ordi-
nary courts. Under the relevant provisions, they are under an obligation to except such 
regulations from application. This obligation should extend to cover reviews as to their 
compatibility with the Convention. In case of incompatibility, courts should be obliged 
to directly apply the self-executing legal rules of the Convention pursuant to Article 134 
of the Constitution and article 5 (2) and (3) of the Judiciary Act. This is upheld by Arti-
cle 2 of the Constitutional Act for the Implementation of the Constitution of the Repub-
lic of Croatia,39 providing for a direct applicability of the constitutional legal rules 
meeting certain standards. Under this Act, ordinary courts have an obligation to directly 
apply unconditional constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and to set aside the 
regulations contrary to them. This obligation includes both the direct application of the 
Constitution, and of the Convention. 
 
36 See e.g. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 E.H.R.R. 553; Article 26 must be applied with a degree of flexibility and 
without excessive formalism.  The rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied auto-
matically; the circumstances of each case must be examined. A realistic account must be taken of the existence 
of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned, as well as the legal and political 
context in which they operate and the personal circumstances of the applicant. 
37 Narodne novine No. 99/1999 
38 Narodne novine No. 3/1994 
39 Narodne novine No. 34/1992 (consolidated text) 
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 However, the situation with respect of laws (acts of parliament) is different.40 
Namely, ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to disapply laws, on whatever 
grounds. A possible incompatibility with the Constitution is solved by a concrete con-
stitutional review under Article 34 (1) of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional 
Court and Article 24 (1) and (2) of the Judiciary Act. However, a possibility of a review 
of laws as to their compatibility with international treaties is not explicitly mentioned. 
Nevertheless, it is clear enough that, due to the principle of the rule of law (Articles 3 
and 5 of the Constitution), ordinary courts are under an obligation not to apply laws 
contrary to the Convention. The problem is, however, in the fact that ordinary courts are 
neither authorised to disapply such laws, nor have an explicit legal basis to institute 
their constitutional review before the Constitutional Court on the grounds of a violation 
of an international treaty. A possible solution lies in interpretation. Namely, technically 
speaking, in an absence of a clear legislative intention to abrogate the Convention, 
courts do not disapply a national law incompatible with the Convention, but interpret 
the national legislation in light of international law (Völkerrechtfreundliche 
Auslegung). It is the very essence of judicial function that exists regardless of the ex-
plicit permissive legal norm. Taking the right to choose applicable law would amount to 
divesting the courts of the essence of their function.  
 The most difficult situation could emerge if the legal rules of a law are incompatible 
with the Convention to the extent which could not be brought in line with the Conven-
tion by any interpretative means. In such a situation, the only possible remedy would be 
an extension of a concrete judicial review under Article 34 of the Constitutional Act on 
the Constitutional Court in order to cover a review of laws as to international treaties. 
Namely, the Constitutional Court is the guardian of the entire Croatian constitutional 
order, and as such has general jurisdiction to protect the hierarchy of legal rules, the 
Convention being at the very top. 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 The ratified international treaties make part of the Croatian legal order that national 
courts are bound to enforce, and the European Convention is granted constitutional pro-
tection before the Constitutional Court. This Court, having powers to strike down un-
constitutional legislation has a chance, at least in theory, to impose significant checks 
on the legislative and executive branch. Moreover, the Constitutional court has clarified 
that ordinary courts have to treat the Convention as entrenched, “higher law” in a man-
ner similar to the one accorded to constitutional provisions; in other words, the Conven-
tion is directly applicable in the Croatian legal order and enjoys a quasi-constitutional 
rank. 
 
40 For purposes of article 14 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court, a "law" is any legal act 
which can be considered a "law" in the substantive and formal sense.  The governmental regulations under 
Article 88 of the Constitution amount to laws in the substantive sense, but lack legal form. Such regulations 
must not elaborate or encroach upon the constitutional rights and liberties. Any governmental regulation 
restricting fundamental rights must necessarily fail this test due to a lack of legal basis for its enactment. The 
legal situation discussed above refers to a possible incompatibility of ordinary acts of parliaments with the 
Convention. 
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 Here a logical question would be whether Croatian ordinary courts, and the Consti-
tutional Court, resort to these mechanisms of protection. As far as ordinary courts are 
concerned there is no easy answer. Namely, the decisions of lower ordinary courts 
(Municipal and County Courts) are not reported, and it is not possible to have access to 
their practice.41 As far as the present author has been informally informed, ordinary 
courts have applied the Convention only on two occasions, but this situation might have 
changed, of course. The Constitutional Court, as we have seen, has recoursed to the 
Convention as a legal basis for striking down acts of legislature, but its practice is not 
always in line with case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Such is the situa-
tion e.g. in respect of Article 11 of the Convention, more particularly, regarding the le-
gal status of associations.42 Also, the Constitutional Court does not deal with the right to 
strike under Article 11 of the Convention but under Article 60 of the Constitution which 
falls into the category of economic, social, and cultural rights. Accordingly, the Court 
would rather resort to ILO Conventions and the International Pact on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, than to Article 11 of the Convention.43 
 As to the methods of interpretation, the Constitutional Court has indeed several 
times resorted to rationality review44, but has never even attempted to employ the stan-
dards of public policy developed by the European Court of Human Rights. Therefore, 
the proportionality test under the “necessary in democratic society clauses” of relevant 
articles of the Convention and the margin of appreciation doctrine, remain a square root 
of nothing in the Croatian constitutional practice. To be completely honest, it should be 
said that the proportionality principle has been invoked by the Constitutional Court only 
once, not under the Convention, however, but under the Croatian Criminal Procedure 
Act.45 Nevertheless, the Court has never elaborated the criteria for the application of 
this principle. 
 
41 It seems that there is a strong feeling among Croatian judges that only the final cases could be reported, 
i.e. cases decided by the Supreme Court. 
42 The Court did not follow the understanding of associations expressed by the European Court. A student 
association established by a law was said to be an association, despite of the practice of the European Court to 
consider such associations entities vested with public authority. Decision of the Constitutional Court No. U-I-
638/1996, of July 9th 1997, Narodne novine 78/1997; Compare with the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in  Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, decision of June 23rd 1981, Series A, No. 43. 
43 Compare the decisions of the Constitutional Court Nos. U-I-262/1998 and U-I-322/1998 of July 15th 
1998, as well as the decisions Nos. U-I-920/1995 and U-I-950/1996 of 15th  July 1998, all published in 
Narodne novine No. 98/1998. However, even the European Court of Human Rights exercises self-restraint in 
the area of labor law. Compare Frowein und Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 2. Auflage, 
N.P. Engel Verlag, Kehl, Straßbourg, Arlington, 1996, at p. 417 
44 In an important decision the Constitutional Court has declared unconstitutional one law on temporary 
taking possession of and management of certain property (Zakon o privremenom preuzimanju i upravljanju 
određenom imovinom. Narodne novine Nos 73/1995 and 7/1996) on the grounds that it was not aimed at 
achieving legitimate regulatory purposes, i.e. at the protection of property. See Narodne novine No. 100/1997 
45 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. U-III-1162/1997 of December 2nd 1998, Narodne novine 
156/1998. 
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 To conclude: In the first eight years of constitutional review in Croatia, the Consti-
tutional Court has developed strong mechanisms for the application of the Convention 
in the Croatian legal order, and the position of the Convention itself is constitutionally 
entrenched. However, the actual application of the Convention is still scarce and incon-
clusive. Such activity certainly contains a potential for being an important judicial safe-
guard of the separation of powers balance. Nevertheless, this potential too often rests 
idle, or ineffective. 
 
Translated by the author 
